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Should Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?
Alexander Monge-Naranjo, Juan M. Sánchez, Raül Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Faisal Sohail 
1 INTRODUCTION
The large dispersion in real wages across countries suggests a potentially huge global 
misallocation of human capital. Thus, reallocating human capital could substantially increase 
global output and drastically change the world income distribution. To be sure, reallocating 
humans across countries is a much more complex endeavor than reallocating physical capital. 
Migrant workers, and not machines, leave behind friends, families, and other attachments 
Are human and physical capital stocks allocated efficiently across countries? To answer this question, 
we need to differentiate misallocation from factor intensity differences. We use newly available esti-
mates on factor shares from Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) to correctly 
measure the factor shares of physical and human capital for a large number of countries and periods. 
We find that the global efficiency losses of the misallocation of human capital are much more substan-
tial than those of physical capital, amounting to 40 percent of the world’s output. Moreover, contrary 
to the findings of Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) for physical capital, the 
global misallocation of human capital does not seem to be subsiding. We argue that the proper 
measure of global misallocation requires considering the potential gains of reallocating both physical 
and human capital. In this case, the implied efficiency loses from misallocation are up to 60 percent 
of global output. Attaining those gains, contrary to the prominent Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990), would 
often require physical capital to flow from poor to rich countries. (JEL O11, O16, O41) 
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and may face cultural and anti-immigrant resistance. Moreover, the impact—real or perceived—
of foreign workers on the local population has been used as a political banner that has no 
counterpart with the impact of capital inflows. Yet, despite all those frictions and barriers, 
workers and their human capital have been continuously reallocated across countries, often-
times in great measure. As of today, in the United States and in many other countries, such a 
reallocation is evident not only in high-human-capital-intensive institutions, such as univer-
sities, hospitals, and research institutions, but also much more generally in stores, restaurants, 
and farms, all of which often agglomerate workers from all over the world.
In this article, we assess the potential global efficiency gains and distributional impacts of 
reallocating human capital across countries. To this end, we face a number of challenges. First, 
we need to take a stand on which factors are fixed in each country and which factors can be 
reallocated—if any—including human capital. Second, we need to control for factor intensity 
differences across countries to avoid confusing them with distortions. Third, we need to 
measure or infer the marginal valuation of human capital across countries and incorporate 
some of the distributional constraints that countries may impose for the entry of workers from 
abroad. We use the recent work by Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) 
that provides exactly the data required to address these three issues for a sample of 76 countries 
and for the years 1970 to 2005. First, aside from pure total factor productivity (TFP), natural 
resources are ultimately the only fixed inputs of production in each country. Using the mea-
sures in Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019), we assess the curvature of 
the production function of the different countries with respect to all the mobile factors, that 
is, human and physical capital, and evaluate the gains of reallocating human capital only or 
human and physical capital simultaneously. Second, we use the measures in Monge-Naranjo, 
Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) to control factor intensity differences across coun-
tries, which they show are not sensitive to policy distortions. Third, we circumvent the lack 
of direct and reliable measurements of the relative value of human capital across countries 
and periods, using the model to generate two extreme and opposite bounds for the observed 
costs of labor across countries.
Our basic efficiency benchmark consists of equating the marginal returns to human 
capital across countries. Doing so points to large misallocation of human capital during the 
sample period, in the range of 40 to 50 percent of global output, with an upward trend over 
time. Our findings resemble those in Klein and Ventura (2009) and Kennan (2013), using 
different models, countries, and data. This basic benchmark abstracts from the barriers to 
reallocating human capital (workers) across countries, which can be very stringent. Some of 
the barriers are natural, such as the emotional cost of reallocating human beings across coun-
tries with different languages, cultures, and values. But other barriers are the result of policies 
and legislation, mainly in the more developed countries. Such barriers are surely motivated 
to prevent a reduction in the wages of some of the domestic workers. In fact, the large implied 
global output gains from the basic benchmark come at the cost of drastic reductions in the 
wage rate (per unit of human capital) in developed countries.
To appraise the potential gains in global output without the negative impact on the domes-
tic workers of developed countries, we construct policy counterfactuals that are constrained 
Monge-Naranjo, Sánchez, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, Sohail
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2019      279
so that the real wages of workers must be kept constant (at the implied levels from the data). 
By design, if workers were the only factor that could be reallocated across countries, no real-
location would take place and global gains would be zero. However, if both human and physi-
cal capital could be reallocated, even under such a conservative exercise, the global gains would 
be substantially higher than reallocating physical capital alone, around 8 percent to 9 percent 
of global output in the 1970s and up to 6 percent by the 2000s.1 Interestingly, the reallocation is 
largely from the richer and poorer countries (first and fourth income quartiles) toward the 
middle ones (second and third income quartiles.)
Overall, a proper assessment of global misallocation considers both human and physical 
capital. The complementarity between these two factors plays a role, as they must be directed 
toward the countries with higher fixed productivity, either because of TFP or natural resources. 
Observed allocations deviate from such an alignment. More interestingly, if human and physi-
cal capital can be reallocated jointly to equalize their marginal returns across countries, the 
direction of the physical capital flows can be reverted relative to the case when physical capital 
is the only mobile factor. In fact, the premise that capital should flow from rich to poor coun-
tries is unwarranted: When both factors are reallocated, capital and labor would flow from 
some of the poor and middle-income countries toward some of the richer countries. This 
simple yet often ignored point could be one of the keys to understanding the consequences 
of alternative integration schemes with or without labor mobility for countries and regions 
with different productivities and fixed endowments (e.g., the United States and Puerto Rico 
and the European Union on one side, with NAFTA on the other).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 presents 
our organizing model framework. Section 4 describes the behavior of the estimated marginal 
product of human capital. Section 5 presents the main results in terms of misallocation of 
human capital. Section 6 studies the effect of migration flows on the changes in misallocation 
over time. The conclusion follows.
2 DATA
In this section, we describe the available data, the countries for which we have consistent 
reliable data, and the method used to compute input’s share of output.
2.1 Countries
We use Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez’s (2019) estimates of the factor 
shares for natural resources, together with data from Penn World Table (PWT) 8.0 for all 
other variables, that is, output, labor shares, international prices of consumption, and output, 
and estimates for physical and human capital.2 We have consistent data from 1970 to 2005 
for the following 79 countries: 
• Africa: Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Tanzania, South Africa, and Zimbabwe
• Asia: Bahrain, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, the 
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Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Oman, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and Taiwan
• Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden
• The Americas: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Uruguay
• Oceania: Australia and New Zealand
We exclude Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Oman from our reallocation exercises because 
these countries do not have data on human capital. This implies a total of 76 countries for 
our benchmark sample.
In Section 5.2, we expand our analysis to countries for which we can retrieve information 
on rents of natural resources, factor shares, physical capital, human capital, and output for 
the year 2005. The improvement on data collection and sources over time and the presence 
of new countries since the early 1990s (e.g., from Eastern Europe), implies more countries 
for which the required data are available. This new set of countries includes Armenia, Benin, 
Botswana, the Central African Republic, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macao, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Togo, and Ukraine. This yields a total sample of 107 countries 
for the year 2005.
2.2 Input’s Share of Output 
We now explain how we incorporate the Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez 
(2019) estimates of the factor shares for natural resources, ϕRj,t , for the computation of the 
output shares for capital and labor.
We denote the labor share of output by θj,t. In this article, we use the PWT variable labsh. 
This measure of the labor share aims to correct for the part of ambiguous income, mainly 
proprietors’ income (i.e., the self-employed), that needs to be attributed to labor income in 
order to avoid underestimating the contribution of labor to output. This is a particularly rel-
evant issue in countries in which a significant amount of labor is allocated to family-owned 
farms and other various forms of self-employment.3
For the output share of physical capital, denoted here by ϕKj,t , the standard practice is to 
equate it to 1 minus the labor share. All nonlabor income must be capital income, an assump-
tion driven by a constant-returns-to-scale production function with only physical and human 
capital as factors. Instead, as proposed by Caselli and Feyrer (2007), correctly accounting for 
the income shares of natural capital factors, the physical capital share should be calculated as
(1) φ j ,t
K =1−θ j ,t −φ j ,t
R .
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Thus, we are able to make this adjustment using data on the income shares of natural 
capital, ϕRj,t , from Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019). Note that the 
output share of natural resources is important for our computations because it determines 
the returns to scale of mobile factors—human and physical capital—in each of the countries.
3 THE MODEL
In this section, we set out our baseline model and derive the benchmarks used to evaluate 
the degrees of misallocation of mobile factors across countries.
3.1 The Baseline Environment
Consider a world economy, populated by an arbitrary number J of countries, indexed by 
j = 1,2,…,J. Given our data, we index the (yearly) time periods by t = 1970,1971,…2005. Our 
baseline model assumes a single tradable good, which can be consumed or invested across all 
countries. In each country, output is produced using the service flows of the country’s stocks 
of physical capital, Kj,t ; natural resources (land and other natural resources), Tj,t ; and human 
capital-augmented labor, Hj,t  = hj,tLj,t , where Lj,t  indicates the number of workers in country j 
in period t and hj,t  their average skills or human capital. Production in the country is also a 
function of the country’s overall TFP, Aj,t .
Our baseline model stems from the standard one-sector growth model, assuming that 
production of the good in country j at time t is Cobb-Douglas. Specifically, we consider a 
production function of Yj,t  in the form
(2) Yj ,t = Aj ,t K j ,t
γ j ,tTj ,t
1−γ j ,t( )1−θ j ,t H j ,t( )θ j ,t ,
where 0 < θj,t < 1 is the labor share of output. The non-labor share of output, 1 – θj,t, is divided 
between a share γj,t(1 – θj,t) for produced capital, Kj,t , and a share (1 – γj,t)(1 – θj,t) for natural 
resources. This specification extends the standard model in two dimensions. First, it introduces 
non-produced capital (natural resources) Tj,t . Second, it allows for country-time variation in 
the factor shares as documented in the previous section.
In our framework, the marginal product of one unit of human capital in terms of the 
quantity of goods (QMPHj,t) is simply given by




Similarly, the marginal product of one unit of physical capital in terms of the quantity of 
goods (QMPKj,t) is given by
 QMPK j ,t =φ j ,t
Yj ,t
K j ,t
= γ j ,t 1−θ j ,t( )Yj ,tK j ,t .
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3.2 Efficient Allocations
We focus on the efficiency of the allocation of factors across countries, treating the global 
supply of human and physical capital as predetermined in any period. Thus, we abstract from 
the impact of misallocation on the incentives to accumulate those factors. Instead, we explore 
the potential gains, in every period, from reallocating human capital across countries. For 
concreteness, we assume that all output is globally mobile. For brevity, we bundle the fixed
factors in each country, TFP and natural resources, in the term Z j ,t ≡ Aj ,tTj ,t
1−γ j ,t( ) 1−θ j ,t( ). 
3.2.1 Baseline. The optimal global allocation is defined by the maximization of global 
output
 YW,t
K* ,H* = max
K j ,t , Hj ,t{ } j=1
J





∑Hj ,t ≤HW ,t and
j=1
J
∑K j ,t ≤KW ,t ,
where HW ,t ≡
j=1
J
∑Hj ,tO  and KW,t ≡
j=1
J
∑K j ,tO  for all t and HOj,t  and K Oj,t  are the observed levels of 
human and physical capital, respectively. In addition to equalizing the QMPKj,t of all coun-
tries to a common world price, rt
K, efficiency requires that all QMPHj,t be equalized to a com-
mon price
(3) rt
H =θ j ,tZ j ,t K j ,t( )γ j ,t 1−θ j ,t( ) Hj ,t( )θ j ,t−1 .
Thus, the world supply levels KW,t and HW,t and the productivities and endowments of natural 
resources Zj,t of all countries pin down the equilibrium rt
K and rt
H. These prices and the factor 











The efficient allocation implies that human and physical capital are allocated across countries 
to complement their TFP and natural resources as allowed by their country-specific returns 
to scale of mobile factors. There is no closed-form solution except for the case of common 
(time-varying) factors shares, but the numerical optimization is trivial.
We will also present results for reallocating only human capital. In that case, the allocation 
of physical capital is taken as given, in the same way that the allocation of natural resources is 
taken as given in the problem presented above.
3.2.2 Value Benchmark. The previous benchmark presumes that workers are indifferent 
as to where to work and cross-country differences in output per worker are sustained by policy 
barriers to worker migration. The global misallocation measure derived from the correspond-
ing counterfactual assesses the global costs of those policy barriers.
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The completely opposite view is that instead of policy barriers, wage differences are sus-
tained by compensating differences; i.e., wage differences are sustained by workers demanding 
different wages to live in different places.4 Alternatively, we can consider political constraints 
that prevent as unfeasible any reallocation that lowers the real wages of workers. In any event, 
to circumvent these concerns, we now consider the simple exercise in which the reallocation 
of workers and capital is constrained to keep constant the real wages of workers in all coun-
tries in terms of consumption goods. 
This exercise requires data on wages (per unit of human capital), the price of consumption, 




j,t , real wages in terms of output, 
for each country in each period. The PWT has measures for the price of consumption and of 
output but does not contain direct measurements of wages per unit of human capital in terms 
of output, whj,t . Thus, we use our model and infer these wages as wj,t = θj,tYj,t /Hj,t = QMPHj,t. We 
now explore the misallocation of factors given the constraint that any reallocation must keep 
the wages of workers in each country at this level. Notice also that if only workers, but no 
physical capital, are allowed to move, the reallocation would be minimal, due only to the small 
variation in the data for the relative price PCj,t /P
Y
j,t . Notice also that by fixing the real wages of 
all countries at a point in time, this counterfactual is consistent with any decomposition of 
those wages arising from compensating differentials or barriers to the mobility of workers.
For this efficiency benchmark, we keep the assumption that output is completely mobile 
across countries.5 Then, the maximization is the same, but the resource constraints are differ-
ent. First, the global amount of goods paid for human capital services in each period is equal 








Y w j ,t











Y H j ,t
O  and HOj,t is the observed data value for country j in period t. Similarly, 








Y K j ,t ≤KW ,t
N .
Finally, as mentioned above, this maximization is also subject to providing the same amount 
of consumption goods to workers as inferred from the data, before the reallocation.
There is an intuitive interpretation for this exercise. Imagine a firm owner who is able to 
reallocate resources across countries, and the firm is small enough that it takes prices as given. 
In terms of wages, imagine this owner is limited by country-specific regulations (unions, mini-
mum wages, and so on) to pay the period-t wage in country i for any worker that the owner 
reallocates to country i in period t. The owner is given the task of reallocating workers across 
countries to maximize real output subject to keeping the company’s payroll constant. Since 
we measure wages by QMPH (disregarding PCj,t /P
Y
j,t differences), the firm’s owner has no incen-
tives to reallocate workers if capital cannot be reallocated. In this sense, this exercise provides 
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a lower bound for the global gains of human capital reallocation. Once capital can also be 
reallocated, there are potential gains of reallocating workers, even subject to the constraint of 
keeping wages constant in each country.
The optimality conditions require the equalization across countries of the price-corrected 






K γ j ,t 1−θ j ,t( )Aj ,tTj ,t1−γ j ,t( ) 1−θ j ,t( ) K j ,t( )γ j ,t 1−θ j ,t( )−1 Hj ,t( )θ j ,t







h θ j ,tAj ,tTj ,t
1−γ j ,t( ) 1−θ j ,t( ) K j ,t( )γ j ,t 1−θ j ,t( ) Hj ,t( )θ j ,t−1
for human capital. Note that, given the world’s returns Rt and Rt
H, the physical-to-human 
















Thus, in the efficient allocation, physical capital intensity relative to human capital intensity 
varies across countries according to their (i) factor shares in production, (ii) relative prices of 
consumption and capital goods, and (iii) effective costs of labor. While natural resources, 
Tj,t , and pure TFP, Aj,t, enhance the amount of human and physical capital a country should 









them. It is trivially true that this maximization dominates the one where only capital can be 
reallocated. The interesting question is how much and whether the capital flows change in 
magnitude and direction.
4 THE MARGINAL PRODUCT OF HUMAN CAPITAL
First, we report salient features of the behavior of the cross-country dispersion in the 
marginal product of human capital (MPH). These results complement the characterization 
in the behavior of the marginal product of physical capital (MPK) provided by Monge-Naranjo, 
Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019). The dispersion of MPH is large and growing over 
time, and the accumulation of human capital does not track the behavior of the determinants 
of MPH. Second, to the extent that differences in MPH are driven by barriers to the mobility 
of labor across countries, the global gains of reallocating human capital would be an order of 
magnitude higher than those of reallocating physical capital. Third, the ability to reallocate 
workers would not only enhance the gains in global output from reallocating physical capital, 
but, more interestingly, also induce a reversal in the direction of reallocation of capital across 
countries. Instead of flowing from richer to poorer countries, capital from poorer countries 
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would follow some of their workers in the direction of richer countries. This simple result 
could be useful in understanding the difference between integration agreements with labor 
mobility (e.g., the European Union) and without it (e.g., the North American Free Trade 
Agreement [NAFTA]).
We can simply decompose the cross-sectional variance of lnQMPHi,j in terms of the labor 
share of output and the output-to-human capital ratios:
 var lnQMPHj ,t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = var lnθ j ,t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+var ln Yj ,t H j ,t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+ 2cov lnθ j ,t , ln Yj ,t H j ,t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦.
Table 1 reports the values of these variances and the covariances for a number of years in 
the sample period. The right side of the panel also reports a number of covariances of interest 
with respect to the joint reallocation of human and physical capital across countries.
There is an upward trend in the dispersion in the lnQMPH. From a low value of 0.713 in 
1980, the variance in lnQMPH grows thereafter until reaching its highest value of 0.978 in 
2000. Almost all of the variation is driven by the dispersion in ln[Yj,t/Hj,t]. Indeed, the cross- 
country correlation between lnQMPH and ln[Yj,t/Hj,t] is always above 0.95. Cross-country 
variation in the labor shares of output, lnθj,t , accounts for at most 9 percent of the variation 
in lnQMPH and tends to remain flat, mildly oscillating around 7 percent to 8 percent, 
during the sample period. The covariance between lnθj,t  and ln[Yj,t/Hj,t] provides a negligible 
contribution.
The cross-country covariation between the marginal products of human and physical 
capital is key for the potential gains of jointly reallocating these factors. We find that this 
covariation is negative, but its magnitude is weak. The same applies to the other factors 
shown in the last four columns of Table 1. In the next section, we use the simple efficiency 
benchmarks derived above to assess the potential global gains of reallocating physical and 
human capital across countries.
Table 1
Decomposition of the Variance of MPHj,t , 1970-2000
Variances (logs of each variable) Covariances (logs of each variable)
Year
QMPHj ,t θ j ,t
Yj ,t
H j ,t
θ j ,t ,
Yj ,t
H j ,t










1970 0.756 0.064 0.788 −0.048 −0.082 −0.019 0.740 −0.042
1980 0.713 0.061 0.726 −0.037 −0.169 0.058 0.689 −0.105
1990 0.748 0.058 0.642 0.024 −0.149 0.111 0.666 −0.107
2000 0.978 0.059 0.899 0.010 −0.038 0.029 0.909 −0.021
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0.
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5 GAINS OF REALLOCATION
We compute the gains of reallocation for two samples. The first one consist of 76 countries 
with consistent reliable data for the years 1970 to 2005. Then, we extend the sample to 107 
countries, considering countries with data available for the year 2005.
5.1 Results for the Years 1970 to 2005
Figure 1 shows the global output gains of reallocating both physical and human capital 
(Panel A) and human capital only (Panel B). In each panel, the dashed lines represent the 
gains from the benchmark. The solid lines represent the gains from the value benchmark 
defined above.
The most salient result is that the global gains of reallocating workers can be very large. 
The quantity benchmark indicates that, for all the years in the sample, the global gains would 
be approximately 40 percent of world output (see Panel B of Figure 1). Those gains remain 
relatively flat over the sample period. Although reallocating human capital per se leads to 
very large gains in the quantity benchmark counterfactual, they do not account for the total 
gains of joint reallocation, since the gains of reallocating both physical and human capital are 
even larger (see Panel A of Figure 1), in the range of 55-60 percent of global output.  
The more restricted value benchmark also indicates large gains, but only when reallocating 
both human and physical capital. Under this benchmark, almost by construction, the gains 
of reallocating human capital only would be negligible and mostly driven by a handful of 
countries with dissimilar output and consumption prices. To be sure, the complementarity 






Gains, % Change in Global Output
Equalizing Quantity MPH & MPK
Equalizing Value MPH & MPK








Gains, % Change in Global Output
A. Reallocating H and K B. Reallocating Only H
Figure 1
Global Output Gains of Production Factors Reallocation
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT).
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between these two factors is an important determinant for the gains of jointly reallocating 
physical and human capital. 
Most interestingly, under both the baseline and the more restrictive benchmark, we find 
that jointly reallocating physical and human capital across countries can lead to capital flow 
reversals relative to reallocating physical capital only. This is not a minor point. In cases in 
which only physical capital can be reallocated, that physical capital would flow from rich to 
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log(K) Before Reallocation
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log(K) After Reallocation log(K) After Reallocation
log(K) Before Reallocation













A. Reallocating Only K, Baseline Benchmark B. Reallocating K and H, Baseline Benchmark
C. Reallocating Only K, Value Benchmark D. Reallocating K and H, Value Benchmark
Figure 2
Countries’ Physical Capital Observed in 2005 and Counterfactual Reallocation 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT).
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ensuing literature. In cases in which both physical capital and human can be reallocated, both 
may flow toward some of the rich countries, often from poor countries. This simple yet often 
ignored point could be one of the keys to understanding the consequences of alternative inte-
gration schemes with or without labor mobility for countries and regions with different pro-
ductivities and fixed endowments (e.g., the United States and Puerto Rico and the European 
Union on one side, with NAFTA on the other).
To illustrate this result, for 2005, the last year in our baseline sample, Figure 2 reproduces 
the observed physical capital (horizontal axes, in logs) and compares it with the hypothetical 
level that each country would receive under the different counterfactual exercises (vertical 
axes, in logs.) In Panels A and B, we compare the results from the baseline, real quantities 
exercise. In Panels C and D, we compare the results from the more restrictive value exercise. 
In the left panels, A and C, we report the results for reallocating only physical capital.6 In the 
right panels, B and D, we report the results for reallocating both physical and human capital.
As anticipated above, Figure 2 shows that the implied reallocation of capital can reverse 
direction and instead of moving from rich to poor countries, may end up moving from some 
poor—and some rich—countries to other rich countries. Noticeably, when reallocating only 
physical capital, the observed levels and the resulting levels are fairly similar; that is, the obser-
vations are concentrated near the 45-degree line. This is true regardless of whether we use the 
baseline or the restricted value benchmark. However, the patterns are very different in the 
right panels, when reallocating both physical and human capital. In those cases, we see that 
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Gains of Reallocating Human and Physical Capital Across Income Quartiles
NOTE: Results of equalizing QMPK and QMPH (Panel A) and VMPK and VMPH (Panel B) across countries from 1970 to 2005.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and FAOSTAT.
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quite a few countries with low levels of physical capital would end up having even lower levels 
after the efficient reallocations. This is evident especially in Panel B, where many countries lie 
much lower than the 45-degree line. But notice that it is not only that capital would flow from 
poor to rich countries, but indeed, there would be massive flows from some rich to other rich 
countries.
To examine these distributional implications further, in Figure 3 we show the hypothetical 
change in the output of the countries grouped by income quartiles.7 In Panel A, we show the 
results of equating both quantity marginal products—QMPK and QMPH—across all countries. 
Panel B shows the results for the more restricted counterfactual equating VMPK and VMPH 
across countries, where we impose that the wages of workers across countries must remain 
constant at the level before the reallocation. Two interesting patterns emerge. First, in the quan-
tity counterfactual, the richer countries (fourth quartile) and sometimes the middle-to-high 
income countries (third quartile) would expand production, while the poorer countries (first 
and second quartiles) always contract. Such a reallocation from poor to rich necessarily involves 
physical capital. Clearly, the required reallocation is exactly the opposite from Lucas (1990). 
This simple result could prove useful for understanding the resulting capital flows from eco-
nomic integrations, differentiating between those in which workers can be reallocated (e.g., the 
European Community and the United States and Puerto Rico) and those in which they cannot 
(e.g., NAFTA and the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement [CAFTA]). 
This simple result could also be useful in understanding the allocation of physical and human 
capital across regions within large countries (e.g., the United States, Brazil, and China). 
Second, the quantity and the value counterfactuals lead to very different reallocation pat-
terns. Once we impose the distributional restriction that foreign workers must earn the same 
income as domestic workers, the direction of global reallocation reverts, from rich to poor 
countries. Wage restrictions of the form imposed here endogenously make the human capital 
of countries behave as fixed factors, and reallocations tend to be similar as when physical 
capital is the only mobile factor. The wages of developed countries are too high, resulting in 
factor flows to countries in the second and third income quartiles, but not to the poorest ones, 
because of their lower productivity and larger curvature.
5.2 Results Extending the Sample of Countries
So far, we focused on a sample of 76 countries for which we were able to consistently 
retrieve information on rents of natural resources, factor shares, physical capital, human 
capital, and output, from 1970 to 2005. With improvement in data collection with time, as 
well as the emergence of new countries in the 1990s (for example, after the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe), data for more countries are available now than in the past. In this section, 
we extend our benchmark sample to the set of 107 countries for which we can retrieve all 
necessary information to perform our analysis for the year 2005. Thus, we explore the robust-
ness of our main results to the increased sample size.
In Table 2, we compare the global output gains from equalizing physical and human 
capital between our benchmark sample and the extended sample. We find minor differences 
across samples—if at all; our benchmark sample tends to underestimate the global gains of 
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reallocation compared with the extended sample. First, equalizing MPH yields similar insights. 
Second, the joint global reallocation of physical and human capital implies that, in quantity 
terms, our output gains in the benchmark sample are 55.96 percent, while in the extended 
sample they are 57.32 percent. That is, our extended sample leads to more global output gains. 
These underestimations are more apparent in value terms, where the output gains are 5.78 
percent in our benchmark sample and 7.74 percent in our extended sample.
For the extended sample, in Figure 4 we use maps to show winners and losers of realloca-
tion. The pattern of reallocation of human capital is quite interesting. The countries receiving 
migrants (blue in the map) are all developed: the United States, Canada, Western Europe, 
and Australia. The countries sending the most human capital abroad are China, India, Ukraine, 













Winners and Losers of Reallocation with the Extended Sample: Output Gains (%) from Equalizing QMPH 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and FAOSTAT.
Table 2
Comparing Gains in Output, 2005
Quantity (%) Value (%)
Benchmark Extended sample Benchmark Extended sample
Equalizing MPH 42.52 42.18 0.25 0.25
Equalizing MPK & MPH 55.96 57.32 5.78 7.74
Number of countries 76 107 76 107
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and FAOSTAT.
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6 ANOTHER REALLOCATION PUZZLE?
The previous results suggest that instead of physical capital, the culprit of misallocation 
is human capital. Even in our restrictive value benchmark, the ability to reallocate workers 
across countries would greatly enhance the global output gains of reallocating physical capital. 
Moreover, there is indication that the allocation of labor has not improved over time, because 
the gains of joint reallocation are flat over time, while the gains of reallocating physical capital 
have declined—as shown by Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019). There 
is already a literature discussing the puzzling direction of physical capital flows (Feldstein 
and Horioka, 1980; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Ohanian, Restrepo-Echavarria, and Wright, 
2013; and Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez, 2019). In this section, we con-
duct an analogous analysis of human capital flows.
To examine whether there is a reallocation puzzle for human capital, we regress the change 
in human capital on several variables and find the following: The measure of initial MPH 
appears insignificant in accounting for the change in human capital (displayed in Table 3). 
Changes in TFP and physical capital are insignificant in accounting for changes in human 
capital. The R-squared values of these regressions are low, indicating that these forces are not 
that important in driving investment in human capital. These results seem to be in line with 
Easterly (2001, pp. 72-73), who argues that “The growth response to the dramatic educational 
Table 3
Population-Weighted OLS Regression, ∆H, 1970-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔlnZ 0.081 (0.085) 0.098 (0.091) 0.044 (0.093) −0.044 (0.095) −0.021 (0.089) −0.067 (0.083)
ΔlnK 0.092 (0.069) 0.033 (0.070) 0.070 (0.106) 0.117* (0.067) 0.065 (0.062) 0.109 (0.081)
Δlnθ –1.133** (0.429) −0.935** (0.385) — −0.706 (0.429) −0.568 (0.383) —
ΔlnPY
PC
1.157** (0.455) — — 1.083*** (0.373) — —
VMPH1970 ×10
–3 −0.015 (0.014) — — −0.025 (0.015) — —
QMPH1970 ×10







×10–3 — — −0.014 (0.013) — — −0.011 (0.013)
Includes OECD  
countries
Y Y Y N N N
Observations 76 76 76 53 53 53
R2 0.411 0.340 0.176 0.471 0.349 0.174
NOTE: OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and  
*** p < 0.01. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and FAOSTAT.
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expansion of the last four decades has been distinctly disappointing...creating skills where 
there exists no technology to use them is not going to foster economic growth.”
To measure the role of human capital flows more directly, we construct a counterfactual 
sequence of human capital stock for each country H̃j,t. More precisely, the stock of human 
capital of country j in year t is
 %Hj ,t = s j ,1970 ⋅HW ,t ,




We also examine the flows of human capital by analyzing net migration flows to each 
particular country f j ,t
H{ }. Since we do not have information about the human capital of the 
migrants, we assume that migration changes the number of persons living in a country but 
not the average human capital index or the share of people employed. For example, that would 
be the case if the net flows from each country have the same characteristics as the population 
of that country.
Data on net migration are taken from the World Bank and are available at 5-year intervals 
starting in 1972; we use linear interpolation to infer missing flows. To construct human capital 
flows f̂ Hj,t from population flow data f
H
j,t, we make several assumptions. We assume that a share 
dt of migrants f
H
j,t are employees. This share is equal to the average employment-to-population 
ratio:



























Gains, % Change in Global Output Gains, % Change in Global Output
A. Reallocating H and K B. Reallocating Only H
Equalizing Quantity MPH & MPK
1970 Human & Physical Capital Shares
1970 Human & Physical Capital Shares + Net Migration Flows
Figure 5
Counterfactual Global Output Gains of Production Factors Reallocation
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 8.0, World Bank, and FAOSTAT.
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To convert these employment flows dt f
H
j,t to human capital-augmented labor f̂
H
j,t, we assume 
that migrant human capital is equal to the human capital in the country hj,t into/out of which 
labor is flowing, so that f̂ Hj ,t = hj ,t ⋅ dt f j,t
H( ). Assuming migrant human capital is equal to the 
global mean yields similar results. As with physical capital, the sum of human capital flows 
does not add to zero. Adjusting the flows to ensure these flows add to zero does not change 
our results.
We find that the observed investments in human capital since 1970 made the global 
allocation of human capital significantly worse (Figure 5). If in 2005 human capital had been 
distributed according to the shares per country in 1970, the gains of reallocation would have 
been 30 percent instead of 43 percent. The difference, 13 percent of global output, is a measure 
of how much worse the allocation of human capital is due to changes that have taken place 
since 1970. Adding migration flows does not change the picture, so the changes in human 
capital that worsen the allocation of human capital are internal.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We use new data on natural resources shares from Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 
and Sánchez (2019) to uncover the degree of global misallocation of human capital. We find 
the implied global efficiency losses of the misallocation of human capital are almost 60 percent. 
If anything, the misallocation of human capital seems to have worsened. Some interesting 
patterns arise when we explore the joint reallocation of physical and human capital. First, the 
gains are substantially higher. Second, the direction of reallocation can change and, instead 
of capital flowing from rich to poor countries, as first explored by Lucas (1990), we find that 
capital—and workers—should flow from poor to rich countries. This simple point could help 
in understanding the consequences of alternative integration schemes with or without labor 
mobility for countries and regions with different productivities and fixed endowments (e.g., 
the United States and Puerto Rico and the European Community on one side, with NAFTA 
on the other). n
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NOTES
1 According to the Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulália-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) estimate, the gains of just reallocating 
physical capital for the same countries and years are about 3 percent.
2 We focus on the human capital measure available in PWT 8.0 since our exercise requires a measure that is widely 
available for many countries, including those at the bottom of the income distribution.  Models with imperfect 
substitutability (e.g., Jones, 2014, and Caselli and Ciccone, 2019) and comparative advantage (e.g., Hsieh et al., 
forthcoming, and Monge-Naranjo, Mies, and Tapia, 2019) would provide a richer framework to evaluate the gains 
of reallocating different types of workers across countries but would require much more data and/or estimates 
across many countries.  
3 See Cooley and Prescott (1995), Gollin (2002), and Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015).
4 Modeling and empirically disciplining the workers’ compensating differences for living and working in different 
countries lies outside the limits of this article. See Klein and Ventura (2009) for interesting quantitative work.
5 See the discussion in Section 1 of Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019.)
6 See Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) for a more detailed discussion of the reallocation of 
capital.
7 These are simple quartiles, that is, unweighted by population or other criteria for size.
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